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This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous 
players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-
environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a university (“the lab”) and a farm 
management training centre (“lab-in-the-field”). The treatments have two different distribution rules 
which are varied in a within-subjects manner. After subjects have experienced both, they can vote for 
one of the two rules: either a differentiated bonus that results in equal payoff for all, or an 
undifferentiated, equal share of the group bonus. In a between-subjects manner, subjects can vote for 
a (minimum or average) threshold or are faced with an exogenous threshold. The results indicate that 
exogenous thresholds perform better, possibly because the focal point they provide facilitates 
coordination. With regard to the two distribution rules, the results are mixed: average contributions 
and payoffs are higher in the lab under the ‘equal-payoff’ rule, but there is no significant difference 
between the two in the lab-in-the-field, possibly because contributions in the lab-in-the-field are much 
less efficient. Overall, our results suggest that environmental payment schemes should not only 
consider farmer heterogeneity in the design of group contracts, but pay explicit attention to 
coordination problems as well.  
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To reduce the spatial scattering of agri-environmental interventions and decrease administration 
costs, agri-environmental management in the Netherlands has recently been re-organized to target 
farmer collectives (Westerink et al. 2015). Individual farmers can no longer receive subsidies or 
payments for environmental services but instead have to organize themselves in collectives to become 
eligible. These collectives formulate a joint plan for agri-environmental management on the basis of 
which a group contract is negotiated with the regional government. The collective is responsible for 
meeting the targets of the group contract, and it pays individual farmers for the contributions made.  
In defining the size and scope of the group contract, farmer collectives face the difficulty of reaching 
consensus in a heterogeneous group (Finus 2008). Collectives are heterogeneous in terms of farmer 
types (e.g. dairy vs. crop farmers) and scale of activities (e.g. small part-time vs. large commercial 
farmers), which results in significant differences in opportunity costs. As payments are currently 
uniform across farmers, in most collectives only a limited group of farmers participates in group 
contracts and group ambition levels remain low. The literature indicates that differentiated payments 
may increase both the number of farmers participating and the level of contributions (Kesternich et al. 
2014). Collectives are reluctant to differentiate payments, however, as they argue that ‘what's sauce 
for the goose is sauce for the gander’.  
Experimenting is an effective tool to discover how different payments may affect contribution levels 
and group ambitions in different settings (Ledyard 1995). Hence, in close collaboration with the 
association of agri-environmental farmer collectives, we developed a threshold public goods game 
with heterogeneous players to examine if and how different payoff distribution rules and endogenous 
choices (of the distribution rule and the ambition level) affect group outcomes. We decided on a 
threshold public goods game as this most closely resembles the agri-environmental conservation 
scheme: only when the collective manages to provide a certain level (or threshold) of environmental 
services will the subsidy be paid. Our experiment builds on Kesternich et al. (2014) who find that, in a 
linear public good game, the distribution rule that equally distributes payoffs among heterogeneous 
players (‘equal-payoff-rule’) maximizes payoffs for all player types. In addition, we build on the finding 
of Gallier et al. (2017) that endogenous choice of the distribution rule improves group outcomes, and 
more generally on Dal Bó et al. (2010) who show that exogenously imposed policies yield lower 
cooperation levels than the same policy when it is endogenously (democratically) chosen.   
Our paper contributes to this literature by assessing whether the findings on benefit sharing and 
endogenous choice in standard public good games are transferable to a threshold public good setting. 
Compared to standard linear public good games, threshold public goods games are fundamentally 
different in incentive structure as the threshold turns the game into a coordination game (Ledyard 
1995). In such a threshold public good game setting, Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) find that 
heterogeneous groups, where players have different endowments, are less successful than 
homogenous groups. Introducing endogenous choice may further exacerbate the coordination 
problem, while at the same time it may reduce the incentive to free-ride (Dal Bó et al. 2010). The 
expected impact of various burden sharing rules  and of endogenous choice in a  threshold public good 
setting with asymmetric players is thus unclear, and we try to provide some insights by running a lab 
experiment. To test whether the findings are applicable outside a conventional lab setting, we take the 
lab to the field. In particular, we conduct sessions among farm management students, who have no 
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experience at all in economic experiments, but share a number of characteristics with the farmer 
population, to which most of the agricultural management students also belong. 
Strictly speaking, our lab-in-the-field is more a lab than a field experiment, but by engaging farm 
management students, we aim to see whether these subjects with no previous lab exposure perform 
differently from standard experimental subjects, while controlling for differences in preferences, game 
understanding and other characteristics in the analysis.  
2. Background 
Compared to standard linear public good games, threshold public goods games are fundamentally 
different in incentive structure as the threshold turns the game into a coordination game (Ledyard 
1995). Whereas in standard public good games the Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is to 
contribute nothing to the public good, threshold public goods games typically have multiple Nash 
equilibria: contributing zero is one of them, but all strategies in which total group contributions are 
equal to the threshold are equilibria too. The threshold acts as a reference or focal point and several 
studies have found a positive relation between a reference point and agents’ effort provision and 
performance (Fiegenbaum et al. 1996, Koszegi and Rabin 2006, Abeler et al. 2009). Higher thresholds 
typically increase contributions but also increase the probability that the target is not met (Rapoport 
and Suleiman 1993, Finus 2008). Generally, the success rate of threshold public good games ranges 
from 40 to 60 percent (Alberti and Cartwright 2016), but settings and parameters matter a lot. For 
example, higher Step Returns1 lead to higher individual contributions and success rates (Croson and 
Marks 2000), and the same holds for higher rewards (bonuses) when the target is met or a money-
back guarantee when the target is not met (Cadsby and Maynes (1999). Subject heterogeneity 
increases the coordination problem. Rapoport and Suleiman (1993, for instance find that adding 
heterogeneity (via different endowments) reduces success rates: with heterogeneity, the threshold is 
less often reached.  
One way to improve performance in games with heterogeneous players is the introduction of rules: 
Benefit sharing or burden sharing rules facilitate coordination by reducing heterogeneity in payoffs. In 
the public good games literature, there is ample attention for the impact of different burden or benefit 
sharing rules on contribution levels (Balafoutas et al. 2013; Gallier et al. 2017; Kesternich et al. 2018; 
Walker et al. 2000; Kesternich et al. 2014) and the impact of minimum contribution rules (e.g. 
Kesternich et al. 2014; Dannenberg et al. 2014; Kocher et al. 2016; Martinsson & Persson 2016; Sutter 
and  Weck-Hannemann 2003, 2004). In the threshold public good game literature, attention for burden 
sharing and minimum contribution levels is limited. One of the few exceptions is a recent study by 
Brick and Visser (2015), who study burden sharing rules in a threshold public good game with a climate 
change framing. They find that in the choice of the burden sharing rule subjects use equity principles 
in a self-serving way, resulting in lower contributions and lower success rates.   
In our study we compare performance in a threshold public good game under two distribution rules. 
In addition, we examine whether it matters if the distribution rule is exogenously imposed or chosen 
by the subjects. Dal Bó et al. (2010) report an “endogeneity premium” effect: individuals may behave 
differently when a game or policy was chosen by them or imposed, and thus treatment effects may 
depend on whether the treatment is endogenous or exogenous. In line with this, Gallier et al. (2017) 
                                                          
1 Similar to the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) in a standard public good game (see Isaac et al. 1984), the Step Return 
measures the value of the public good relative to that of the forgone private good for threshold public goods games. 
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find that subjects who can vote for a burden sharing rule in a linear public good experiment receive on 
average higher payoffs than subjects who face an exogenous rule.    
As mentioned before, we conducted the experiment in a standard lab setting, using a standard subject 
pool, as well as in a more lab-in-the-field type of setting, using a more targeted group of subjects. We 
are interested to see if these different subject groups behave similarly or not. Subject pool 
characteristics may influence game outcomes in several ways. Cooper et al. (1999, 2006) indicate that 
professionals may perform better than students because of experience, for example in overcoming 
coordination failure at the work floor. Similarly, List (2003) and Potters and van Winden (2000) show 
that experience explains why senior managers or traders are more rational in their decisions than 
subjects without such experience. When comparing student subject pools, students of economics 
often perform different from non-economic students. Here, the analysis has focused on economics 
students being less generous and more self-interested (Bauman and Rose 2011), which has turned out 
not be caused by the content of the study but rather by self-selection effects (Cipriani et al. 2009). 
Finally, Cadsby and Maynes (1998a,b) indicate that female students, and female professionals, are 
better at coordinating efforts, although they suggest that this does not necessarily improve game 
efficiency.  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Experimental design 
As mentioned in the introduction, the experiment has been designed in close collaboration with the 
Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. In each experimental session, groups of 
four subjects play 12 rounds of a threshold public goods game. Group composition remained the same 
throughout the session, i.e. we used partner matching. In each round, subjects receive an endowment 
e, equal to 20 points, which they can use to make a contribution qi to the public good. If total group 
contributions are at least as high as a threshold level T, a bonus is paid to the group members. This 
bonus is 1.6 times the threshold, corresponding to a Step Return of 0.4 (Croson and Marks, 2000). If 
the threshold is not met, no bonus is paid, and subjects’ contributions are not returned. In the standard 
condition, the bonus is divided equally among the group members, i.e. we apply the so-called equal-
sharing-of-the-bonus rule. The payoff πi of group member i in a round in this condition is thus as 
follows: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖 + 0.4𝑇  if ∑𝑖𝑞𝑖 ≥ 𝑇; 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖   otherwise. 
The parameter ci represents the cost of contributing, and it is used to introduce heterogeneity among 
the subjects. In most experiments, heterogeneity is introduced via endowments (rich and poor players, 
e.g. Tavoni et al. 2015, Kesternich et al. 2018, Levati et al. 2007), and sometimes via the MPCR 
(Kesternich et al. 2014. We introduce heterogeneity in costs since this best mimics actual group 
decision-making in the agri-environmental setting we consider. In each group two group members are 
of the low-cost type, with ci = cL = 0.6, and two group members are of the high-cost type, with ci = cH = 
1.2.  Types are randomly assigned, and subjects do not change their cost-type throughout the game. 
Note that the above setting represents a social dilemma as 𝑐𝐻 > 𝑐𝐿 > 0.4. Not contributing is a Nash 
equilibrium, as well as most combinations of contributions with ∑𝑖𝑞𝑖 = 𝑇.  Note also that in out set-
up the reward (bonus) for reaching the threshold is not fixed, but it depends on the level of the 
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threshold. This level may or may not be set by the subjects, depending on the treatment.  Note also 
that group contributions above the threshold do not affect the bonus and are not compensated.2 
In addition to this ‘equal-sharing-of-the-bonus’ rule subjects also play a condition with another 
distribution rule, the ‘equal-payoff’ rule (Kesternich et al. 2014). As explained above, the equal-sharing-
of-the-bonus rule implies that if the threshold is met, each group member receives an undifferentiated, 
equal share of the group bonus, namely 1.6T/4. Under the equal-payoff rule, there is differentiation in 
bonus payments. Group members receive different shares of the group bonus in such a way that every 
group member receives in principle the same payoff, namely 𝜋𝑖 = (4𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑙𝑞𝑙 − 2𝑐ℎ𝑞ℎ + 1.6𝑇)/4.
3  
The 12 rounds are divided in three phases of four rounds. In phases 1 (rounds 1-4) and 2 (rounds 5-8), 
all subjects play with the two exogenously determined distribution rules (so within-subjects).4 In line 
with Putterman et al. (2011), after having experienced both rules in phases 1 and 2, we let subjects 
choose their distribution rule.  That is, before phase 3 (rounds 9-12) commences, the group chooses 
which distribution rule will be implemented for their group in phase 3. This decision is made through 
majority voting (with the computer randomly deciding the outcome in case of a tied vote). All subjects 
play with an endogenously determined distribution rule in phase 3.    
We run several variations of this set-up in a between-subjects setting (see Table 1). Besides the 
distribution rule (varied within subjects), we vary two other factors between subjects: the threshold 
origin (whether the threshold is determined exogenously or endogenously), and – within the 
endogenous threshold treatments – whether the threshold is based on the average or lowest 
(minimum) proposed threshold in the group. In total this yields six different treatments, see Table 1. 
In each round of the endogenous threshold treatments, group members (simultaneously) propose a 
group threshold before making a contribution. Depending on the treatment, the group threshold is 
then based on the average or the lowest (minimum) proposed threshold, and subjects are informed 
about the resulting group threshold T before making their contribution choice. In each round of the 
exogenous threshold treatments, the group threshold is just imposed (no proposals). To ensure 
comparability between the exogenous and endogenous threshold treatments, we first conducted the 
endogenous treatments, and based the exogenous thresholds in each round on the median of the 
thresholds proposed (per round and per group). This is a common approach in the literature (see for 
instance Sutter and Weck-Hanneman 2003, 2004). Finally, inspired by Kallbekken et al. (2011), we pay 
explicit attention to learning in game design: in all treatments we ask subjects at the start of the 
experiment which of the two distribution rules they prefer, and measure their preference again after 
they have experienced both distribution rules.  
3.2. Experimental procedures 
We conducted the lab experiment with a total of 204 participants at Tilburg University’s CentERLab in 
March 2017. The lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted with a total of 148 participants5 at Van 
                                                          
2 In our view, this best mimics the situation with the farmers in the Netherlands, in which the bonus is based on the level 
(ambition) as specified in the contract (and not on total contributions or a fixed amount).  
3 In some rare cases with a very extreme contribution distribution, equal payoffs may not be feasible. In those cases, the 
equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule is automatically implemented. Subjects are informed about this in the instructions.  
4 Subjects play either equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule in phase 1 and the equal-payoff rule in phase 2, or equal-payoff rule 
in phase 1, and equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule in phase 2, see Table 1.  
5 In total, 160 students participated, but we had to exclude 3 groups from the analysis as we did not fully succeed in 
preventing communication between them.   
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Hall Larenstein University of Applied Sciences in Leeuwarden in November 2017. The lab experiment 
in Tilburg was programmed and conducted with z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). For the lab-in-
the-field experiment in Leeuwarden, we implemented the oTree open source platform (Chen et al. 
2016) using the Internet Explorer browser in the students’ computer labs (Goossens 2017).                  
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design, the treatments and treatment names, and the number 
of groups per treatment. To account for potential ordering effects, we alternated the order of the 
distribution rules within a treatment. For instance, treatment ESPM implements the equal-sharing-of-
the-bonus rule in rounds 1-4 and the equal-payoff rule in rounds 5-8, whereas treatment EPSM 
implements the rules in the reversed order. 
Table 1. Experimental design 
* The exogenous thresholds were based on the median of the thresholds proposed under the ESPM and EPSM treatments.    
As Table 1 shows, we did not conduct all treatments in both locations. The exogenous threshold 
treatments were only implemented in the lab, and the treatments with thresholds based on average 
proposals were conducted only in the lab-in-the-field. In fact, the average threshold treatments were 
only included after the lab experiment, at the request of the association of farmer collectives, as they 
argued that although most collectives indeed take the lowest ambition level, other collectives use the 
average. Given that the lab experiment indicated no significant differences between the endogenous 
and exogenous threshold treatments, we dropped the exogenous treatments in the lab-in-the-field.  
Apart from the difference in treatments, the lab and the lab-in-the-field experiment were identical 
except that a minimum level of framing was added to the instructions of the lab-in-the-field 
experiment, in order to clarify game design. Framing was added at the request of the association of 
farmer collectives, for whom the lab-in-the-field was a pre-test for conducting the experiment with 
farmers at a later stage. We minimized framing to ensure that results remained comparable: The 
experimental instructions, with the framing highlighted, are provided in Annex A. Note that whereas 
the lab experiment was in English, the lab-in-the-field experiment was in Dutch.  
Finally, we did not pay a show up fee to subjects in the lab-in-the field as their participation was 
mandatory: the experiments were scheduled by the school administration requiring mandatory 
attendance. Students at the lab participated voluntarily and were recruited through a mailing list. They 
were paid a 5 euro show up fee.  Both in the lab and the lab-in-the-field, students were paid earnings 
from three rounds, the computer randomly selecting one round per phase to be paid out. In all 
sessions, the value of each point was 0.10 eurocent. 
In both locations, the experimental sessions were run by the same experimenters. Each experimental 
session lasted approximately one hour, and on average subjects earned about 11 euro (including the 
show up fee) in the lab and 6 euro in the lab-in-the-field. After the experiment subjects filled in a short 





Distribution rule order 
(phase 1 - phase 2) 
Treatment 
name 
Lab no. of 
subjects (groups) 
Lab-in-the-field no. 
of subjects (groups) 
Exogenous Minimum* Equal sharing - equal payoff XSPM 48 (12)  
Exogenous Minimum* Equal payoff - equal sharing XPSM 40 (10)  
Endogenous Minimum Equal sharing - equal payoff ESPM 60 (15) 28 (7) 
Endogenous Minimum Equal payoff - equal sharing EPSM 56 (14) 20 (5) 
Endogenous Average Equal sharing - equal payoff ESPA  48 (12) 
Endogenous Average Equal payoff - equal sharing EPSA  52 (13) 
Total number of subjects (groups) 204 (51) 148 (37) 
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background characteristics. We used this information to analyse game behaviour, and the differences 
in behaviour between the lab and the lab-in-the-field.  
3.3. Expected results and statistical methods 
First, in line with Kesternich et al. (2014), we expect the equal-payoff rule to result in higher average 
contributions and payoffs than the equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule. We do not expect the change in 
game incentives resulting from having adapted the experiment to a threshold public goods game to 
affect this result. Second, we are ambiguous about the effect of endogenous choice. With regard to 
the endogenous choice of the threshold, Dal Bó et al. (2010) find that an institution or policy that is 
exogenously imposed, such as a threshold, yields lower cooperation levels than an endogenously 
(democratically) chosen one. However, their finding reflects a public goods setting, whereas in a 
threshold public goods setting an exogenous threshold may improve coordination by providing a clear 
focal point. With regard to the endogenous choice of the distribution rule, we have no reason to expect 
a different result from Gallier et al. (2017) who observe that any distribution rule that is endogenously 
selected is an improvement upon an exogenously imposed rule. Still, in our case the coordination 
problem of having to decide on the preferred distribution rule may again reduce the advantage of 
endogenous choice. Third, given the differences in exposure to experiments between the two subject 
pools, and the general notion that conducting lab-in-the-field experiments introduces heterogeneity 
and potential noise (Schram 2005, Levitt and List 2007), we expect subjects in the lab-in-the-field to 
encounter more coordination problems than students in the lab.  
To analyse the experimental data, following Gallier et al. (2017), Kesternich et al. (2014), and Croson 
and Marks (2000) we perform non-parametric tests and random-effects regressions (adjusted for 
group clusters). We use Mann–Whitney U (MW-U) tests to compare results between different 
treatments (between subjects), and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks (W S-R) tests to compare 
results across phases in a treatment (within subjects). Game efficiency indicators are the group 
threshold, the group contribution, the frequency of threshold met (or success rate), the over-
contribution rate, and the group payoff. The frequency of threshold met is the ratio between the 
number of times that groups meet their threshold and the total number of rounds played, and the 
over-contribution rate is an indicator that measures the efficiency of group contributions in a particular 
round, determined by (∑𝑖𝑞𝑖 − 𝑇)/𝑇. The higher the ratio, the more inefficient the group has played, 
while a negative ratio means that the group has not met the threshold.6  Unless indicated otherwise, 
we run all tests using group averages as units of observations. In addition to the non-parametric tests, 
we run ordinary least square random-effects regressions on individual contributions and individual 
payoffs.  We focus mostly on phase 1 as subjects’ behaviour is less affected by previous rounds’ results, 
and hence, the potential impacts of game factors and institutions can be estimated in a cleaner way. 
4. Results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the group threshold, the group contribution, the success rate, 
the over-contribution rate, and the group payoff as the average over all rounds of each treatment.7 
                                                          
6 This ratio is not defined for T = 0. However, in total there only 24 cases (out of 1056, about 2% of all observations) where T 
= 0, and it is restricted to 10 groups. When presenting results these 24 cases are deleted, but results do not change 
substantially if we included these with value 0.  Annex B also shows the average over-contribution rates when defined as 
(∑𝑖𝑞𝑖 − 𝑇)/∑𝑖𝑞𝑖.  
7 Table 2A in Annex B presents the summary statistics for these variables per phase.  
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The table indicates that average group contributions range between about 26 and 44 points, and that 
realized group thresholds vary between approximately 22 and 42 points across treatments.                       
The exogenous threshold treatment (XSPM) in the lab has the highest average group payoff (87 points), 
while the endogenous average threshold treatment (ESPA) lab-in-the-field treatment has the lowest 
average group payoff (74 points), which is below the total group endowment. On average, group 
contributions seem to be lower in the lab than in the lab-in-the-field, and the standard deviations of 
group thresholds and group contributions show that variation between groups is higher in the lab than 
in the lab-in-the-field. By definition, the realized group thresholds are higher for the average threshold 
treatments (ESPA and EPSA) than for the minimum threshold treatments, but differences in group 
contributions between these treatments are much smaller.  












Lab results      
XSPM 22.28 (15.62) 25.78 (16.97) 76 (26) 0.32 (0.40) 87.42 (12.22) 
XPSM 26.63 (12.48) 29.13 (11.24) 76 (16) 0.31 (0.38) 84.24 (7.69) 
ESPM 24.65 (13.57) 28.70 (14.92) 71 (23) 0.42 (0.58) 79.52 (8.71) 
EPSM 29.02 (13.76) 32.07 (13.94) 67 (13) 0.19 (0.16) 81.40 (8.14) 
Lab-in-the field results     
ESPM 23.62 (10.42) 34.35 (13.64) 80 (12) 1.71 (2.09) 76.71 (6.58) 
EPSM 23.85 (4.66) 39.16 (7.08) 90 (11) 1.54 (1.42) 78.09 (11.80) 
ESPA 41.90 (10.09) 39.84 (10.43) 48 (22) -0.01 (0.14) 74.00 (11.12) 
EPSA 42.21 (11.72) 43.85 (12.15) 63 (28) 0.95 (0.34) 83.66 (12.13) 
Standard deviations of groups’ average values over 12 rounds are given in parentheses. 
Success rates (based on the ‘frequency of threshold met’) range from slightly below 50 to about 90 
percent. Compared to the literature, the upper bound of this range is relatively high: Croson and Marks 
(2000) and Alberti and Cartwright (2016) report success rates of 40 to 60 percent, which corresponds 
to the success rates observed in the treatments with average proposed threshold.  
Table 2 indicates that a high success rate does not always translate into high payoffs. Specifically, 
payoffs in the endogenous minimum threshold treatments ESPM and EPSM in the lab-in-the-field are 
lower than in the corresponding lab treatments even though the success rates are higher.  This is 
mainly due to high over-contribution rates. Indeed, over-contribution rates are especially high in the 
lab-in-the-field treatments (often even more than 100 percent), while in the lab this rate is about 30 
percent (we will elaborate on this in more detail below). So even though most groups in the 
endogenous minimum threshold ESPM and EPSM lab-in-the-field treatments reach the threshold, the 
inefficiency of their choices results in relatively low payoffs. The negative sign of over-contribution rate 
in treatment ESPA explains the low average success rate in this treatment: on average groups ‘under-
contribute’ and thus do not meet the threshold.  
Figure 1 shows the average round by round development of thresholds and group contributions in all 
treatments in which the threshold was endogenously determined. The top panels show that average 
thresholds in the lab and in the lab-in-the-field (LITF) are rather close and seem to increase somewhat 
across rounds. Contributions are largely consistently above the thresholds and apart from the last 
phase of the top right panel, contributions are higher in the lab-in-the-field.  Coordination seems to 






Figure 1. Average threshold and group contribution over time in all endogenous threshold treatments 
 
The bottom panels of Figure 1 show that although the resulting thresholds in the average threshold 
treatments are higher than in the minimum threshold treatments (almost by definition), the difference 
in contributions between treatments with average and minimum threshold is small, irrespective of the 
order of the distribution rule. This pattern is rather persistent and explains the high success rates and 
over-contributions rates in the two treatments with a minimum threshold. In the following, we 
perform pairwise comparisons of related treatments to test the effects of the variables of interest: 
distribution rule, threshold origin, endogenous choice of distribution rule, and subject characteristics. 
4.2 Equal-payoff rule versus equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule 
To evaluate the impact of the two distribution rule on group performance we compare group 
outcomes in phase 1 between (pairs of) treatments: the endogenous minimum threshold treatments 
ESPM versus EPSM (in both the lab and the lab-in-the-field), the exogenous threshold treatments XSPM 
versus XPSM in the lab, and the average threshold treatments ESPA versus EPSA lab-in-the field. 
Moreover, within each treatment, we carry out tests between phase 1 and phase 2 as these phases 
differ only in distribution rule imposed (see Table 2A in Annex B for summary statistics). Test results 
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The equal-payoff rule seems to perform weakly better in between-subject comparisons. Between the 
two endogenous threshold treatments in phase 1 in the lab, groups in ESPM treatment (which first 
play with the equal sharing of the bonus rule) make significantly lower group contributions (p = 0.0636, 
MW-U test), and obtain significantly lower group payoffs (p = 0.0145, MW-U test) than groups in the 
EPSM treatment (which first play with the equal-pay-off rule). There are no differences in the group 
threshold, the frequency of threshold met, or the over-contribution rate (p ≥ 0.1192, MW-U tests). All 
other pairwise comparisons between treatments, do not yield a significant difference in any of the 
factors (all p ≥ 0.1229, MW-U tests), except for the threshold level between XSPM and XPSM 
treatments in the lab. However, these thresholds were selected exogenously based on the median 
threshold in comparable endogenous treatments. Therefore they do not reflect subjects’ behaviour in 
the game.  
In the lab, within-subject comparisons show that the equal-payoff rule performs better than the equal-
sharing-of-the-bonus rule. It does not matter whether the equal-payoff rule is played in phase 1 or in 
phase 2. In both phases, groups playing under the equal-payoff rule, in at least half of the treatments, 
generate significantly higher average group thresholds, make significantly higher group contributions, 
and receive significantly higher group payoffs (p  0.0937, W S-R tests). In the rest of the treatments, 
there is no significant difference (p ≥ 0.2115, W S-R tests). Success rates and over-contribution rates 
do not differ considerably between treatments in the lab (p ≥ 0.2277, W S-R tests), except for the EPSM 
treatment. In this treatment, under equal-payoff rule (in phase 1), groups have significantly higher 
success rates (p = 0.0038, W S-R test), but also significantly higher over-contribution rates (p = 0.0063, 
W S-R test). However, group payoffs are still higher under the equal-payoff rule. Therefore, playing 
under the equal-payoff rule is better or at least not worse than under the equal-sharing-of-the-bonus 
rule in all treatments in the lab. 
In the lab-in-the-field, however, distribution rules do not have the same (systematic) impact on group 
performance. Comparing the impact of different distribution rules within treatments yields no 
difference in group contribution in any treatment (p ≥ 0.2249, W S-R tests). Group threshold are either 
higher (p  0.0796, W S-R tests) or about the same in phase 2, and over-contribution rates are always 
significantly higher in phase 1 (p  0.0431, W S-R tests). In fact, groups in the lab-in-the-field slightly 
increase their thresholds in phase 2 but keep group contributions at the same level, thus reducing 
over-contribution rates. This happens in all lab-in-the-field treatments no matter which rule is played 
first. Thus, it is hard to say which rule performs better. Success rates do not change significantly 
between the two phases, except for the endogenous average threshold EPSA treatment where the 
success rate decreases in phase 2 under equal-payoff rule (p = 0.0755, W S-R tests), which results in 
significantly lower group payoffs (p = 0.0712, W S-R tests). Finally, in the endogenous minimum 
threshold EPSM treatment, group payoffs are lower under the equal-payoff rule (p = 0.0431, W S-R 
tests), which is due to the fact that group payoffs in phase 1 suffer from higher over-contribution rates 
and low thresholds. Overall, if anything, the equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule seems to result in better 
game performance in the lab-in-the-field. 
4.3 Endogenous versus exogenous choices 
In our experiment, endogenous choice has two dimensions: (i) subjects vote for a (minimum or 
average) threshold in the endogenous threshold treatments, and (ii) subjects vote for one of the two 
distribution rules before the start of phase 3 in all treatments. Here, we examine if either of these 
dimensions has an effect on subjects’ behaviour in the game.  
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4.3.1 Endogenous choice of the threshold 
Table 2 already showed that the success rates of the exogenous threshold treatments in the lab were 
higher than those of the corresponding endogenous threshold treatments. Also in terms of group 
payoffs the endogenous threshold treatments do not perform better: Average group payoffs in the 
exogenous treatments XSPM and XPSM are about 87 and 84 points, respectively, while they are lower 
in the endogenous treatments ESPM (almost 80 points) and EPSM (81 points).  
To test whether the endogenous threshold choice has a significant effect, we compare group 
contributions, success rates, over-contribution rates and group payoffs of the exogenous and 
endogenous treatments both over all rounds and in phase 1 of comparable treatments (i.e. ESPM 
versus XSPM, and EPSM versus XPSM), see Table 2A in Annex B. Note that in phase 1, the data are 
again ‘cleaner’ because subjects’ decisions have not been affected by previous experiences in the 
game. The test results show that the exogenous threshold treatments weakly dominate the 
endogenous ones: outcomes do not differ significantly (p ≥ 0.1370, MW-U tests) except for group 
payoffs, which are significantly (but not substantially) higher for the XSPM exogenous threshold 
treatment,  both in phase 1 and over all three phases (p < 0.05, MW-U tests). Details are presented in 
table 6, Annex B. Thus, we find no evidence that endogenous choice of the threshold improves group 
performance. 
4.3.2 Endogenous choice of the distribution rule   
Subjects vote for their preferred distribution before the start of phase 3, after having experienced the 
exogenously imposed distribution rule in phases 1 and 2. Figure 2 illustrates that the trend in average 
group payoff is not significantly and positively affected by the introduction of a new distribution rule, 
neither between phase 1 and phase 2, nor in phase 3. It also shows that although group payoffs are 
not significantly different between treatments, they are typically higher in treatments with exogenous 
thresholds as compared to those with endogenous thresholds. 
  
Figure 2: Average group payoffs, lab (left) and lab-in-the-field (LITF; right) 
Table 7 in Annex B presents the results for within-treatment tests of phase 1 and 2 averages (the first 
8 rounds) versus phase 3 averages (the last 4 rounds). We find that in phase 3: (i) group thresholds are 
not lower (they are significantly higher in three treatments in the lab, p  0.0257, W S-R tests, but two 
of those are exogenous treatments where thresholds are not selected by subjects, and are thus not 
significantly different from the group thresholds in other treatments, p ≥ 0.1730, W S-R tests); (ii) group 
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success rates and over-contribution rates are significantly lower (p  0.0469, W S-R tests) or not 
different than in phase 1 and phase 2 (p ≥ 0.1599, W S-R tests). The lower over-contribution rates can 
probably be attributed to learning. However, lower over-contribution rates only result in significantly 
higher group payoffs in the lab XSPM and the lab-in-the-field EPSM treatments.  
Summarizing, there is no treatment where playing the game under the distribution rule that subjects 
voted for before the start of phase 3 significantly increases performance in term of group contribution, 
success rate, or group payoff. The results thus offer no support for the hypothesis that endogenous 
choice would improve game outcomes. 
Note that one explanation for not finding a strong positive endogeneity premium effect for the 
distribution rule choice could be that a substantial number of groups (about 25 to 50 percent in each 
treatment) ended up with a tied vote. In those cases, the computer randomly selected the distribution 
rule. Hence, it could be that subjects that got to play with a rule they did not vote for started 
contributing less, and subjects that got the rule they voted for contributing more, the two effects 
cancelling out. Hence, as a robustness check, we performed additional within-treatment tests of phase 
1 and2 versus phase 3 averages excluding those groups for which the votes were tied (see Table 8, in 
Annex B). The results indicate that the earlier conclusion does not change: endogenous choice of the 
distribution rule has no significant impact on game outcomes. Group payoffs and success and 
contribution rates also do not show major differences compared to the results in which groups with 
tied votes are not excluded from the data.  
4.4 Influence of subject characteristics 
Earlier, we observed different group outcomes between the lab and the lab-in-the-field sessions. Here, 
we use the post-experiment survey results to check whether subject characteristics and perceptions 
could explain some of these differences. The 204 subjects that participated in the lab sessions in Tilburg 
were BSc and MSc students at Tilburg University with different nationalities and academic backgrounds 
(economics, legal studies, management, social sciences). The 148 students that participated in the lab-
in-the-field sessions in Leeuwarden were Dutch BSc students at the Van Hall Larenstein University of 
Applied Sciences, half of which were students dairy farm management, the other half being students 
of business administration. Of the Leeuwarden students, 72 percent indicated that their family was in 
the agricultural business, and another 15 percent indicated that their family worked in agriculture 
supply services. For the Tilburg students we have no information about family background. Table 3 
presents an overview of the survey findings.  
Table 3. Summary statistics of subjects’ game perceptions 
 Lab results Lab-in-the-field results 
% wanted distribution of payoffs to be fairi 63  41  
% wanted to maximize earningsii 86  65  
% found game explanation cleariii 94  86  
% found the game complicatediv 12   38  
i Question whether respondent agrees with statement “I wanted the distribution of pay-offs (in the experiment) to be fair”. 
We combined the answers of those that “Totally agree” and “Agree”.  
ii Question whether respondent agrees with statement “I wanted to maximize my earnings (in the experiment)”. We 
combined the answers of those that “Totally agree” and “Agree”. 
iii Question whether the respondent believed the explanation of the experiment was clear. We combined the answers “Very 
clear” and “Clear”. 





Note that the distribution of answers between the two groups differs: subjects in the lab-in-the-field 
were less outspoken, with more neutral answers, possibly because they were less used to answering 
questions about their fairness considerations and motivations in playing the game. Students in the lab 
are more experienced participants and generally perceived the game as less difficult. Test results show 
that all four game perception indicators in Table 3 are significantly different across subject pools (p = 
0.000, Fisher’s exact tests).    
To determine the impact of subject’s characteristics on individual contribution and individual payoff, 
we run regression models on individual contribution and individual payoffs in phase 1 (rounds 1-4): 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2min_𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑_𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3min_𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
 
We run equations (1) and (2) for both subject pools. The lab experiment includes the endogenous 
threshold dummy variable and the lab-in-the-field experiment has the additional min_threshold 
dummy variable. Variables included in both regressions are: threshold (threshold level), equal_payoff 
(dummy variable for the distribution rule, equal payoff is 1), low (dummy variable for player low cost 
type), and threshold_met (dummy variable for achieving the threshold). Xi is the vector of personal 
characteristics of player i (see also Table 3), including: earn_much (subjects’ wish to earn as much as 
possible), fair_distribution (subject’s preference for fair payoff), explanation_clear (subjects’ 
understanding about the instruction for the game), and game_complexity (subjects’ perception about 
the game’s complexity). The personal characteristics in Xi are dummy variables that are split based on 
the median value of each subject pool. Finally, to control for group correlation we cluster standard 
errors at the group level. The regression results are presented in Table 4.8 
We find that among the four game perception indicators, none has a significant effect on individual 
payoffs in phase 1. For individual contributions in phase 1, only earn_much has a significantly negative 
impact in the lab-in-the-field, and game_complexity has a negative impact in the lab. Cost type and 
threshold levels do have significant impacts on both individual contributions and individual payoffs in 
the experiment. Contrary to Brick and Visser (2015) we do not find that subjects use equity principles 
in a self-serving way: although insignificant, subjects that find fairness important contribute more, not 
less, thus reducing their individual pay-offs. 
As expected, low cost subjects contribute about 2 points more but still also earn significantly more 
than high-cost subjects (payoffs are about 1 point higher in the lab and 3 points higher in the lab-in-
the-field, averaged over all treatments). Higher thresholds seem to lead to higher individual 
contributions and higher payoffs. Even though the impact is not very large, the results are significant 
and in line with the broader literature (Croson and Marks 2000). Under the equal-payoff rule, subjects 
in the lab-in-the-field contribute significantly more compared to when they play under the equal-
sharing-of-the-bonus rule. This confirms the earlier test results in section 4.2. However, the impact of 
the distribution rule on individual contributions and individual payoffs in the lab sessions is not as 
                                                          
8 Note that the regression is based on data from phase 1 only. A dummy variable for the distribution rule vote (phase 3) is 
thus not included, but see section 4.5 for an analysis on distribution rule preferences. 
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significant as the group contribution and group payoff test results shown before. Finally, having an 
endogenous threshold does not significantly affect contributions or payoffs in the lab sessions.9   
Table 4. Individual contribution and individual payoff regressions (phase 1 only) 
 Individual contribution Individual payoff 
 Lab LITF Both locations Lab LITF Both locations 






























































































































N 816 592 1408 816 592 1408 
R-squared 0.319 0.164 0.296 0.383 0.533 0.389 
Standard errors in parentheses       *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01    
 
4.5 Distribution rule preferences 
Finally, we consider the individual preferences for the two distribution rules. Before the start of the 
game (after having read the instructions), we asked subjects which rule they preferred, and again when 
we asked them to vote before the first round of Phase 3 (round 9). We find that subjects seem to adapt 
their preferences on the basis of their game experiences. Figure 3 shows that across treatments there 
is no clear preference for either of the distribution rules at the start of the experiment, in both the lab 
and the lab-in-the-field (p > 0.65, binomial tests, using individual voting decisions as independent 
observations). At round 9, preferences have shifted: the equal-payoff rule is chosen significantly more 
often in the lab, whereas in the lab-in-the-field this is the equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule (p < 0.10, 
binomial tests, votes at group level as independent observations). This is in line with the finding that, 
                                                          
9 Note that the coefficients for endogenous treatment are significant in the regressions for both locations. This is due to the 
fact that the dummy variable is always 1 for the lab in the field sessions (no exogenous threshold). The estimated 
coefficient for endogenous threshold thus includes part of the constant term.  
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in the lab, payoffs were higher under equal-payoff, whereas in the lab-in-the-field, payoffs were higher 
under the equal sharing-of-the-bonus rule. 
Figure 3. Distribution rule preferences, pre-game vs. phase 3 vote 
                             Lab sessions                                Lab-in-the-field sessions 
   




Inspired by recent developments in agri-environmental management in the Netherlands, we have 
analysed several types of group contracts in an experimental setting. This paper assessed in particular 
whether findings related to the sharing of benefits and endogenous choice from public good 
experiments carry over to a threshold public goods game experiment. The latter is more relevant from 
the perspective of environmental policymaking as payment schemes generally require individuals or 
groups to reach a certain threshold provision level before a payment is made.  
The analysis considered three questions: i) does a differentiated bonus (that results in equal payoffs 
for heterogeneous subjects) lead to higher group payoffs and contribution levels than offering an 
undifferentiated, equal share of a group bonus; ii) does endogenous choice of thresholds and 
distribution rules enhance individual contributions and group payoffs and iii) do the results of the lab 
setting carry over to the lab-in-the-field environment? 
Regarding the effect of an exogenous bonus sharing rule (first two phases, rounds 1-8), we find that 
the differentiated bonus rule improves game outcomes, but only in the lab sessions. In the lab-in-the-
field sessions there are no significant differences between treatments, and we argue that one of the 
reasons why outcomes between the lab and the lab-in-the-field differ is that contributions are much 
less efficient in the lab-in the-field: over-contributions are significantly higher in the lab-in-the-field 
setting and although thresholds are met more often, payoffs are generally lower because of the failure 
to coordinate.  
Endogenous choice has two dimensions in our experiment: (i) subjects vote for a (minimum or average) 
threshold in the endogenous threshold treatments, and (ii) subjects vote for one of the two distribution 
rules. For either of the two dimensions, we find no significant impact on game outcomes, and thus no 
support for an endogeneity premium, contrary to the results of Gallier et al. (2017), Dal Bó et al. (2010) 
and Haigner and Wakolbinger (2010). Subjects in the endogenous threshold treatments did not 
perform better than in the exogenous benchmarks, most possibly because the exogenous threshold 
offers a clear focal point. This interpretation seems to be backed by the significantly negative 
treatment effect of the endogenous threshold on individual payoffs.  
With regard to the transferability of findings, we find that game coordination failures were especially 

















experiment to be complicated, this did not explain game behaviour substantially. Interestingly, most 
participants of the lab-in-the-field sessions that perceived the game as complicated were students of 
the dairy farming and management track. In fact, these students indicated that they had found the 
game abstract and difficult to follow, whereas the students of the business administration track 
believed the game to be a good representation of agri-environmental management schemes. This 
could be an indication that exposure alone is not the key difference, but rather experience with 
abstract reasoning. Whereas the students of farm management were generally looking for cues how 
to behave (trying to look at each other’s screen, asking for suggestions and advice) the students of 
business administration did not ask for advice and played the game individually.10  
Finally, and in line with the broader literature, our results show that, on average, higher thresholds 
lead to higher contributions and higher payoffs. As environmental payment schemes are typically 
conditional on reaching a certain threshold of group effort, this suggests that setting higher exogenous 
thresholds may improve outcomes overall. This is an important finding from the perspective of 
agricultural policy making, but further testing is required to assess whether these results hold in the 
field (among real farmers). For this, it may be necessary to introduce more context in game 
explanation. Also, it may be worthwhile to introduce communication: Tavoni et al. (2011) find that 
non-binding pledges can overcome barriers to provide threshold public goods, particularly in 
heterogeneous settings, although Palfrey et al (2017) observe that significant efficiency gains are only 
realized if players can engage in unrestricted forms of communication in the experiment. Although this 
comes at the cost of increased noise and heterogeneity (Schram 2005), from a policy perspective it is 
important to be able to use lab experiments to test policy mechanism design (Ludwig et al. 2011). 
Ideally, this would involve the actual stakeholders, like in our case the farmers participating in 
collective agri-environmental management, but for the actual stakeholders to be willing to participate, 
the experiment needs to be made less abstract and more in line with the actual decision-making 
problem at hand. 
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Annex A: Game protocol (with framing in bold) Endogenous minimum threshold treatment (ESPM)  
Translated from Dutch to English 
WELCOME 
 
We are about to start with a simulation game, or experiment about collective decision-making. We 
have developed the experiment to resemble collective agri-environmental management: from the 
1st of January 2016 onwards, farmers can only receive a subsidy for agri-environmental 
management when they are part of a collective. Collectives of farmers jointly prepare a plan for 
agri-environmental management, including a certain ambition level, for which they can receive a 
subsidy. In the experiment we will talk in more abstract terms about the key elements of the 
collective decision-making process. 
 
The instructions of the experiment will be read out aloud now, and you are invited to read along. You 
are about to participate in an experiment. Before we start, we would like to ask that you do not 
communicate with other people during this session. Please also turn off your mobile phone. You 
receive a show-up fee of €5 for being here today. You can earn additional money depending on your 
decisions and the decisions of other participants. The additional payoff in the experiment will be 
calculated in points, where the exchange rate is 1 point = €0.10.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment, you decide how you want to spend an endowment that will be given to you. In 
each round, the endowment you and all other participants receive is 20 points, the value of which 
corresponds to 2 euro. All the decisions that you make during the experiment will remain 
anonymous. 
 
In the experiment, you will form a group with three other participants. The group composition will 
remain the same in the entire experiment, so you will be in a group with the same participants. The 
choice you and your group members will make is whether you want to contribute (part of) your 
endowment to a group project. If sufficient contributions are made to the group project, that is, if 
total contributions in the group are equal to or higher than a group threshold contribution level, the 
group receives a bonus that is shared between the group members. However, if the threshold 
contribution level is not met (that is, total group contributions are below the group threshold level), 
the group project will not be executed and your contribution to the group project will not be 
transferred back to you.  
 
You may consider the group project as collective agri-environmental management, the threshold 
as the group ambition level for agri-environmental management and the group bonus as the 
subsidy paid when the collective reaches its ambition level, e.g the agreed targets for agri-
environmental management. 
 
In total, the experiment has 3 phases, with each 4 rounds, hence a total of 12 rounds. In each round 






First, you and your group members will be asked to vote for a threshold contribution level for your 
group project. You can vote for a level of 0, 1, 2, 3, … up to 80 points (which is the sum of the 
endowments). The lowest threshold proposed by yourself and your group members will be the group 
threshold level. The group bonus is equal to 1.6 times the group threshold. 
For example, if you vote for a threshold of 40, two group members vote for a threshold of 20 and one 
group member votes for 10, the group threshold contribution level will be 10 points. If the threshold 




Once all votes for the threshold contribution level have been collected, you and your group members 
will be informed about the result: the threshold that will represent the group’s ambition level. Next, 
you will be asked to decide how much of your endowment you want to contribute to the group 
project. Remember, each player has an initial endowment of 20 points. 1 point in the experiment is 
worth €0.10. You can contribute between 0 and 20 points to your group project.  
If the group threshold is met, you receive your share of the group bonus. Recall that the group bonus 
is equal to 1.6 times the group threshold. If the group threshold is not met, you lose your 
contribution to the group project, and no bonus is paid. The same rules apply to your group 
members.   
 
PAYOFFS 
For every player, payoffs are calculated as follows. 
 
If the group threshold is not met, then your 
Payoff = (20 – “cost parameter” × your contribution)  
 
If the group threshold is met, then your 
Payoff = (20 – “cost parameter” × your contribution) + your share of group bonus. 
 
COST PARAMETER 
In each group, two players face a relatively high costs of contributing to the group project and two 
players face a relatively low cost of contributing to the group project. The “cost parameter” 
represents this difference: for the two high-cost players the cost parameter = 1.2 and for the two 
low-cost players the cost parameter = 0.6. The computer will randomly assign two low-cost and two 
high-cost players in each group. You and your group members will be informed about this at the 
beginning of the experiment. 
 
Throughout the experiment, all players remain the same player type (high-cost or low-cost).  
 
DISTRIBUTION RULE  
For the sharing of the group bonus there are two different distribution rules. You will play the first 
phase of 4 rounds with one distribution rule, and the next phase of 4 rounds with the other 
distribution rule. In the last phase of the experiment you can vote for the distribution rule you prefer. 
The two distribution rules are: 
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 Equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule (phase 1, rounds 1 - 4): There is no differentiation in group 
bonus share. If the group threshold level is met, each group member receives an equal share 
of the group bonus; 
 
 Equal-payoff rule (phase 2, rounds 5 - 8): There is differentiation in group bonus share. Group 
members receive different shares of the group bonus in such a way that every group 
member receives in principle the same payoff. 
 
EXAMPLES 
Suppose the group threshold is 50 and total group contributions are equal to or higher than 50 such 
that the threshold is met. The group bonus is equal to 80 points (= 1.6 × 50). 
 
Example 1: Equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule.   
Under this rule each group member receives the same share of the group bonus, 20 (=80/4). 
 
 If a low-cost player type has contributed 5 points, then her payoff will be: 
Payoff = (20 – 0.6 × 5) + 20 = 37 points. 
 If a low-cost player type has contributed 20 points, then her payoff will be: 
Payoff = (20 – 0.6 × 20) + 20 = 28 points. 
 If a high-cost player has contributed 9 points, then his payoff will be: 
Payoff = (20 – 1.2 × 9) + 20 = 29.2 points.  
 If a high-cost player has contributed 17 points, then his payoff will be: 
Payoff = (20 – 1.2 × 17) + 20 = 19.6 points.  
 
Example 2: Equal-payoff rule. 
Under this rule, the group bonus of 80 points is distributed in such a way that each group member 
receives in principle the same payoff.  
 
Suppose a low-cost player type has contributed 20 points, the other low-cost player contributed 10 
points, one high-cost player contributed 14 points and the other 8 points. The group bonus of 80 
points will then be divided as follows: 20.9, 14.9, 25.7, and 18.5 points, such that payoffs will be 
equal for all group members. 
The resulting payoffs will be: 
 
Payoff low-cost player 1 = (20 – 0.6 × 20) + 20.9 = 28.9 points. 
Payoff low-cost player 2 = (20 – 0.6 × 10) + 14.9 = 28.9 points. 
Payoff high-cost player 1= (20 – 1.2 × 14) + 25.7 = 28.9 points 
Payoff high-cost player 2= (20 – 1.2 × 8) + 18.5 = 28.9 points 
 
Note: Under the equal-payoff rule it may happen (but chances are very slim) that the group threshold 
level is met, but it is not possible to distribute the group bonus such that all group members receive 
exactly the same payoff. If this happens the group bonus will be shared equally among the group 





DISTRIBUTION RULE VOTING 
In the first two phases of the experiment the distribution rule is pre-determined: in phase 1 (rounds 
1-4) the distribution rule is Equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule, and in phase 2 (round 5-8), the 
distribution rule is Equal-payoff rule.  
 
At the beginning of phase 3, in round 9, players are allowed to vote on the distribution rule they 
prefer in phase 3 (rounds 9-12). In each group, the distribution rule outcome will be based on 
majority rule voting. So if the majority in your group votes for Equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule, the 
Equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule will apply in rounds 9-12, if the majority in your group votes for 
Equal-payoff rule, the Equal-payoff rule will apply in rounds 9-12. In the case that two group 
members vote for the “Equal-sharing-of-the-bonus rule” and two group members vote for the 
“Equal-payoff rule”, the vote is tied and the computer will randomly determine the distribution rule 
for your group. You will be informed about the voting outcome in your group and about the 
distribution rule that will be applied in phase 3. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL EARNINGS 
If the experiment is complete, the computer will randomly select three rounds to be paid, one in 
each of the three phases. You will receive the payoff of these three rounds in Euros. This payoff will 
be added to the show-up fee of €5.  
 
Are there any questions at this point? Please raise your hand, and we will come to you to answer 
your questions in private.  If there are no further questions, we now continue with a short test. 
Please answer the questions on the following page. When you have problems answering them, 
please raise your hand and we will come by to check your answers. 
 
TEST QUESTIONS 
1) What will be the threshold contribution level if you vote for a threshold of 50, one group 
member for a threshold of 35, another group member votes for a threshold of 20, and the 
last group member votes for a threshold of 80 points?  
…… points 
2) If the threshold contribution level is not reached, will your contribution to the group project 
be transferred back to you?     YES / NO 
3) If you don’t contribute, but the threshold contribution level is reached, do you receive a 
share of the group bonus?   YES / NO 
4) Suppose you are a low-cost type. What will be your payoff under the equal sharing of the 
group bonus rule if the threshold contribution level of 50 points is reached and you 
contributed 10 points? 
…… points 
5) Suppose you are a high-cost type. What will be your payoff under the equal payoff rule if the 





Annex B: Summary statistics by phase and overview of non-parametric test results 


















Lab results       
XSPM 17.91 (9.85) 22.71 (11.71) 79 (28) 0.11 (0.38) 0.57 (1.19) 83.37 (9.42) 
XPSM 23.75 (9.68) 29.75 (8.68) 80 (31) 0.19 (0.23) 0.40 (0.55) 81.70 (13.43) 
ESPM 18.75 (9.82) 25.33 (8.97) 73 (20) 0.17 (0.33) 0.89 (1.40) 76.29 (6.42) 
EPSM 24.93 (11.23) 33.80 (14.73) 84 (23) 0.22 (0.21) 0.47 (0.77) 85.05 (9.65) 
Lab-in-the field results      
ESPM 17.86 (4.37) 38.32 (8.20) 96 (9) 0.50 (0.19) 2.22 (4.15) 73.66 (9.31) 
EPSM 19.05 (3.42) 46.90 (9.58) 100 (0) 0.58 (0.12) 2.16 (2.30) 68.89 (13.35) 
ESPA 37.76 (11.24) 42.21 (12.04) 69 (16) 0.04 (0.15) 0.16 (0.37) 82.91 (9.23) 



















Lab results       
XSPM 20.00 (12.92) 25.15 (15.67) 83 (34) 0.10 (0.39) 0.37 (0.86) 87.51 (10.61) 
XPSM 20.30 (9.42) 23.98 (10.37) 85 (13) 0.15 (0.14) 0.54 (1.51) 87.00 (5.58) 
ESPM 24.92 (14.35) 31.88 (17.35) 82 (29) 0.18 (0.31) 0.59 (1.45) 82.28 (12.24) 
EPSM 25.68 (13.31) 24.84 (14.39) 50 (24) -0.11 (0.20) -0.06 (0.42) 78.31 (10.88) 
Lab-in-the field results      
ESPM 25.68 (15.17) 34.16 (17.25) 82 (24) 0.22 (0.21) 0.77 (1.37) 81.46 (15.42) 
EPSM 27.20 (8.75) 40.69 (12.78) 90 (22) 0.31 (0.18) 0.62 (0.65) 82.08 (12.85) 
ESPA 43.84 (11.05) 41.73 (13.20) 48 (34) -0.24 (0.43) -0.01 (0.34) 72.93 (16.10) 



















Lab results       
XSPM 28.92 (24.10) 29.50 (25.69) 67 (34) -0.11 (0.27) 0.00 (0.29) 91.38 (18.39) 
XPSM 35.85 (18.58) 33.65 (16.73) 63 (38) -0.14 (0.30) -0.01 (0.31) 84.04 (15.74) 
ESPM 30.28 (23.11) 28.88  (25.23) 58 (36) -0.15 (0.43) -0.07 (0.48) 79.98 (17.07) 
EPSM 36.45 (21.23) 37.57 (21.06) 68 (30) -0.12 (0.70) 0.08 (0.38) 80.84 (18.31) 
Lab-in-the field results      
ESPM 27.32 (16.20) 30.55 (19.79) 61 (20) 0.11 (0.16) 1.59 (7.49) 75.00 (13.89) 
EPSM 25.30 (5.49) 29.90 (5.19) 80 (21) 0.18 (0.35) 1.32 (3.18) 83.31 (12.32) 
ESPA 44.09 (10.69) 35.56 (12.66) 27 (33) -0.40 (0.37) -0.17 (0.29) 66.15 (18.92) 
EPSA 45.03 (13.98) 44.31 (19.84) 56 (38) -0.03 (0.28) 0.04 (0.61) 81.16 (18.66) 
Standard deviations of groups’ average values in the phase are given in parentheses. 
*: Defined as (∑𝑖𝑞𝑖 − 𝑇)/∑𝑖𝑞𝑖; **: Defined as (∑𝑖𝑞𝑖 − 𝑇)/𝑇. Excluding 24 cases where group threshold is 0 
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Table 5: Non-parametric test results, distribution rule comparison 
p-value Group threshold Group contribution Success rates Over-contribution rates Group payoff 
Phase 1 Lab ESPM vs Lab EPSM 0.1494 0.0636 0.1192 0.6312 0.0145 
Phase 1 Lab XSPM vs Lab XPSM 0.0134 0.1469 0.7699 0.8951 0.7920 
Phase 1 LITF ESPM - LITF EPSM 0.4143 0.1229 0.3980 0.9353 0.8075 
Phase 1 LITF ESPG - LITF EPSG 0.9566 0.2647 0.1518 0.2534 0.1917 
Phase 1 vs Phase 2 Lab ESPM 0.0937 0.2115 0.2277 0.9547 0.0884 
Phase 1 vs Phase 2 Lab EPSM 0.8753 0.0354 0.0038 0.0023 0.0843 
Phase 1 vs Phase 2 Lab XSPM 0.0455 0.4098 0.7098 0.6098 0.0712 
Phase 1 vs Phase 2 Lab XPSM 0.0039 0.0248 0.9121 0.2845 0.3329 
Phase 1 vs Phase 2 LITF ESPM 0.2367 0.5534 0.1573 0.0180 0.4990 
Phase 1 vs Phase 2 LITF EPSM 0.0796 0.2249 0.3173 0.0431 0.0431 
Phase 1 vs Phase 2 LITF ESPA 0.0060 0.7536 0.0755 0.0150 0.0712 
Phase 1 vs Phase 2 LITF EPSA 0.7007 0.2484 0.1978 0.0231 0.9721 
Table 6: Non-parametric test results, endogenous-exogenous threshold comparison 
p-value Group threshold Group contribution Success rates Over-contribution rates Group payoffs 
Phase 1 Lab ESPM vs Lab XSPM 0.6205 0.3798 0.3017 0.9223 0.0454 
Phase 1 Lab EPSM vs Lab XPSM 0.9059 0.4641 0.9473 0.7697 0.6605 
Three phases Lab ESPM vs Lab XSPM 0.8063 0.5582 0.4013 0.8836 0.0318 
Three phases Lab EPSM vs Lab XPSM 0.5181 0.4823 0.1370 0.7253 0.2695 
Table 7: Non-parametric test results, endogenous-exogenous distribution rule comparison 
p-value Group threshold Group contribution Success rates Over-contribution rates Group payoffs 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 Lab ESPM 0.3201 0.9547 0.0204 0.0007 0.3942 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 Lab EPSM 0.0257 0.1240 0.7764 0.7299 0.8753 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 Lab XSPM 0.0087 0.3078 0.1743 0.0229 0.0843 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 Lab XPSM 0.0046 0.0743 0.2192 0.0469 0.8785 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 LITF ESPM 0.1763 0.1282 0.0299 0.0425 0.7353 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 LITF EPSM 0.6858 0.0431 0.1599 0.0431 0.0796 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 LITF ESPA 0.1823 0.0994 0.0073 0.0096 0.0414 




Table 8: Non-parametric test results, endogenous-exogenous distribution rule comparison (excluding groups with tied votes) 
p-value Group threshold Group contribution Success rates Over-contribution rates Group payoffs 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 Lab ESPM 0.1420 0.5337 0.0084 0.0033 0.9292 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 Lab EPSM 0.2328 0.5754 0.3598 0.4838 0.2626 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 Lab XSPM 0.0192 0.3139 0.1325 0.0077 0.1097 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 Lab XPSM 0.0173 0.0904 0.6089 0.3105 1.0000 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 LITF ESPM 0.5930 0.2850 0.1573 0.2850 1.0000 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 LITF EPSM 0.2850 0.1088 0.3173 0.1088 0.2850 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 LITF ESPA 0.4838 0.0116 0.0138 0.0117 0.0173 
Phase 1,2 vs Phase 3 LITF EPSA 0.0277 0.4631 0.3441 0.1730 0.3454 
 
 
